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Come All Ye Faithful: How the
International Community has Addressed the
Effects of Somali Piracy but Fails to
Remedy its Cause
Donald P. Paradiso*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Now and then we had a hope that if we lived and were good, God
would permit us to be pirates."' It is doubtful that Mark Twain would
have such an impression of the exciting life of a pirate if he actually
knew what a modem Somali pirate's life is like. Somalia has been
described as a "black hole in the international community, divorced from
the world economy, regional and global institutions, and the rule of
law." 2  United States President Barack Obama has stated that "[t]he
poverty and violence in Somalia breeds the terror of tomorrow." In
essence, Somalia is not the place of fairy tale "yo-ho-ho" pirates that the
world believes it to be. Mark Twain would be sorely disappointed.
When this Comment was written, the time was 10:01 PM EST on
Jan. 2, 2010. As this very line of text was being put to page, Somali
pirates were escaping after successfully hijacking the Asian Glory, a
20,000-ton UK-flagged chemical tanker sailing in what was supposed to
be the International Recommended Transit Corridor, a patrol zone
* J.D. Candidate 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University. The author would like to specially thank those who supported him during the
publishing of this Comment. Special thanks go out to his incredible family, friends, and
colleagues, without whom none of this could have been possible.
1. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE Mississippi 32 (1917).
2. International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali
Coast: Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative to the Secretary General
of the U.N. to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Nov. 10-21, 2008) (final
report) 6, available at http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia-piracy-intLexperts
report consolidated.pdf [hereinafter Nairobi Report].
3. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Campaign Speech in
Berlin, Germany (July 24, 2008).
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through the Gulf of Aden patrolled by international naval forces.4 As my
colleagues were wincing and the never ceasing "tickity-tack" sound of
fingers to keyboard, the twenty-five crewmen of the Asian Glory had
been taken hostage.5 It is possible that many of the crew have families.
It is probable that most, if not all of the crewmen, are scared and
wondering if they will ever make it home. With any luck, these
particular pirates follow the modus operandi of most pirates in the region
and will merely demand a ransom from Philbox, Ltd., the shipping
company that owns the Asian Glory.6 If this hijacking is anything like
the hijacking of the De Xin Hai, a Chinese coal-mining ship which a
ransom was paid for yesterday, it will be months before the crew see
their loved ones again.
In 2009, 196 acts or attempted acts of piracy were committed by
these water-borne criminals in the Gulf of Aden, relevant parts of the
Red Sea, and directly off the Coast of Somalia. This Comment will
explore the international law governing the act of maritime piracy and
test its applicability to the acts that transpire daily in the Gulf of Aden.
This Comment also seeks to explain that the international community's
greatest weapon against Somali piracy is to institute the rule of law in an
otherwise lawless nation.
II. BACKGROUND
Piracy by its very nature is a low-risk criminal activity that pays
well.9 Theoretically speaking, it happens for one reason, opportunity,10
and the Gulf of Aden is awash with it. In terms of oil commerce alone,
2006 saw approximately 3.3 million barrels transported through the Gulf
4. Nick Wadhams and Malcolm Moore, UK Ship Taken by Somali Pirates was
Sailing Without Naval Escort, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/worldnews/piracy/6907457/UK-ship-taken-by-Somali-pirates-was-sailing-
without-naval-escort.html (last visited July 15, 2010); Associated Press, Somali Pirates
Hijack Fourth Vessel in a Week, CNN.coM, Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/africa/0 1/02/somalia.hijacking/index.html (last visited July 15, 2010).
5. See Associated Press, supra note 4.
6. See id.
7. See id. On Jan. 1, 2010 China allegedly paid $5 million to free the crew of the
De Xin Hai, a Chinese coal carrier seized off the coast of Seychelles. The ship was taken
on Oct. 13, 2009.
8. See International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau, Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ship Reports 6 (2009), http://www.cruiserlog.com/forums/
index.php?act-attach&type-post&id=2959 (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter ICC
Reports].
9. See MARTIN N. MURPHY, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM:
THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 12 (2007).
10. See id.
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daily." Poverty is generally a precursor to maritime piracy worldwide,
however, it is simplistic to cite poverty as the sole reason for the
existence of organized maritime piracy.12 The national Somali literacy
rate is approximately one-third of all persons over the age of fifteen. 13
Thus, an image of a very desperate populace with nearly non-existent
economic opportunity outside of illegal activities takes form.
Throughout history, piracy has flourished when dominated by organized
gangs that have treated it as a business.14
A. A History ofMaritime Piracy
Before one can gain an immediate grasp on the development of
modern international anti-piracy statutes, one must briefly analyze the
historical trends in which maritime piracy has developed. Pirate attacks
have been documented since before the erection of the Egyptian
pyramids." A milestone in maritime piracy includes Julius Caesar's
abduction by, and subsequent campaign against, the Cilician pirates
around 77 B.C.16 The United States also struggled against pirates during
the First and Second Barbary Wars in the early 1800s by paying ransoms
and then engaging in limited skirmishes. 7  It was during the so-called
"golden age of piracy" from about 1650 to 1720 that bore the
romanticized stories of "argh-me-hearty" pirates questing for riches and
adventure on the Caribbean high seas.' 8
Around the same, time European nations widely issued letters of
marque to cheaply make war with one another as a form of state-
sponsored terrorism.19 A letter of marque is defined as "a license
11. See United States Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration,
Country Analysis Briefs-World Oil Transit Chokepoints, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/
WorldOilTransit Chokepoints/Full.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
12. See id.
13. See United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, Somalia,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2009).
14. See John L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on
Maritime Predation, in BANDITS AT SEA 82, 82-83 (C. Richard Pennell ed. 2001);
Maritime Transport Committee, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and
Economic Impact, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 13 (2003)
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/13/4375896.pdf.
15. See ANGUS KONSTAM & ROGER MICHAEL KEAN, PIRATES-PREDATORS OF THE
SEA: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 32 (2007).
16. See PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH'S LIVES. VII: DEMOSTHENES AND CICERO, ALEXANDER
AND CAESAR, 445 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard University Press 1919) (1994).
17. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE BARBARY WARS 49-78 (2005) (explaining how the
United States first dealt with Barbary pirate attacks by paying tribute).
18. See ANGUS KONSTAM, PIRATES: 1660-1730 3 (1998).
19. See Gary M. Anderson & Adam Gifford, Jr., Privateering and the Private
Production ofNaval Power, 11 CATO J. 99, 101 (1991).
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authorizing a private citizen to engage in reprisals against citizens or
vessels of another nation." 20  When issued to a vessel that would
normally be considered to engage in acts of piracy, it created the legal
authority to stop, board, search, and, under some circumstances, seize
foreign vessels and their cargo.2 1 Therefore, States actually
commissioned pirates to harass and attack the merchant vessels of enemy
22
countries. Pirates were then viewed as weapons in the arsenal of
states.23
England, France and Spain regularly utilized privateers and letters
of marque as weapons in their vast naval arsenals against one another.24
These commissioned pirates, or privateers, were obligated to then
promptly present those seized vessels, or "prizes," to a specialized court,
which normally sat in the privateer's home port, for adjudication.2 5 One
commentator has posited that privateers were regarded by European
powers in much the same way as state-sponsored terrorism is viewed
today: a dastardly yet efficient way to strike one's enemy and hide the
blade.26 Generally, during times of war a state encouraged acts of piracy
against an enemy.27 Then, in times of peace, piracy was deterred.28 This
type of double dealing usually resulted in the once-commissioned
privateers committing acts of piracy against their former state patrons
and others.29
The Declaration of Paris in 1856 placed a moratorium on state-
sponsored acts of piracy. 3 0 Signatories to the Declaration of Paris agreed
that they would no longer use privateers against one another during war
times. 31 Some scholars claim that the Declaration abolished all forms of
piracy, privateering, and state-sponsored terrorism from the European
landscape.32 While the Declaration may have memorialized the intent of
European nations to ban the use of maritime piracy as a legitimate naval
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (8th ed. 2004).
21. See Anderson and Gifford, supra note 19, at 101.
22. See Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic
Theory for Naval Anti Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 12 (2007).
23. See Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 45 (2009).
24. See Douglas R. Burgess, Hostis Humani Generi, Piracy, Terrorism and A New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 293, 307-08 n.6 (2006).
25. See Anderson and Gifford, supra note 19, at 101.
26. See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 31 (2d ed. 1998).
27. See Azubuike, supra note 23, at 45.
28. See id.
29. See Burgess, supra note 24, at 307.
30. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 46 bfSP 26,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 4, 47-49 (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
3 1. See id.
32. See Burgess, supra note 24, at 314.
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weapon, by no means did it solve any of the practical issues associated
with making piracy illegal. 3 Ironically, the United States still maintains
the right to issue letters of marque,34 and Congressman Ron Paul of the
United States House of Representatives recently posited that letters of
marque may be used to address the issue of Somali pirates operating in
the Gulf of Aden."
B. Contemporary Piracy
Somali piracy, as a crime-based industry, originated upon the death
of General Muhammad Siad Barre's socialist dictatorship in the early
1990s.36 The overthrow was one of the clear beginnings of widespread
chaos in the region and has since resulted in descent into a protracted
civil war. 3 7  The consequences of the chaos divided the county of
Somalia into three politically independent regions.38 In the Northwest
lies the breakaway region of Somaliland; the semi-autonomous region of
Puntland is in the northeast; and the south is still nominally controlled by
the UN-recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) but is
actually divided amongst several warlord factions.39 With no effective
state government to provide even the most basic level of deterrence,
piracy has flourished.40
Many Somali pirates believe that their acts have roots in fishing
disputes.41 Because there is no effective government operating along
Africa's longest state coastline, fishing vessels from Europe and East
Asia are exploiting the rich marine resources at the expense of native
Somalis.42 Some commentators have said that the main source of piracy
in the region is comprised of various militias of armed local fisherman in
response to unregulated fishing by foreign fishing vessels, which
33. See Azubuike, supra note 23, at 46.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to ... grant
letters of marque and reprisal."
35. See Interview with Ron Paul, Congressman, United States House of
Representatives (Apr. 15, 2009).
36. See MARTIN N. MURPHY, SMALL BOATS, WEAK STATES, DIRTY MONEY: THE
CHALLENGE OF PIRACY 101 (2009).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See generally Nairobi Report, supra note 2.
42. See Scott Cofen-Smout, Pirates, Warlords and Rouge Fishing Vessels in
Somalia's Unruly Seas, http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/-arl20/somalia.html (last visited Feb.
2, 2010); US Captures 13 Somali 'Pirates', BBC NEWS.COM, Mar. 19, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4822722.stm.
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subsequently become pirate gangs.43 It is no secret that the Somali coast
is rich in commercially lucrative marine life.4 So much so that it is
estimated that EU fishing vessels illegally take out of Somali waters
more than five times the value of EU aid to the country every year.45
Conservatively, that would equate to approximate E230 million 4 6 as of
2009.47 Those captured and accused of piracy often cite this issue. The
Somalis captured by the US Navy ship USS Gonzales in March 2006
apparently claimed to be defending local fisherman by "taxing" illicit
foreign trawlers, as did the attackers of the Dongwon-ho the following
month.4 8
Perhaps something more insidious is afoot in Somalia's territorial
waters. Since the early 1990s, reports have been circulating in Somalia
and the international media regarding the dumping of hazardous waste
along the coastline of Somalia, including regular sightings of suspected
waste containers. 4 9  A UN technical fact-finding mission visited the
Puntland region of Somalia for five days in May 2005 to investigate
allegations of toxic waste unearthed by a 2004 tsunami.50 The mission
visited three key populated coastal locations at Hafun, Bandarbeyla and
Eyl, a region stretching over 500 kilometers in length." The report
advised that no traces of toxic waste were found, but the UN added that
"the urgent need remained for a more comprehensive assessment of the
natural environment of Somalia, which would include further
investigations of alleged toxic waste sites on land, and dumping of toxic
waste at sea." 52 These findings were later called into dispute by a second
UN report that declared that containers of toxic waste previously settled
43. See Abdulkadir Khalif, How Illegal Fishing Deeds Somali Piracy, THE
SOMOLILAND TIMES, Nov. 15 2005, http://www.somalilandtimes.net/200/08.shtml.
44. See Nayan Chanda, No Safe Harbor for Illegal Fishing, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE,
Sept. 15, 2009, http:// www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/innovations/data/000147.
45. See id
46. Or approximately $344 million as of November 16, 2009.
47. European Commission of Humanitarian Aid, Somalia in 2009: Q&A,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/Somalia_QAFeb09.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2010).
48. See Bo-Mi Lim, Militants Who Seize S. Korea Ship off Somalia Say They're
Defending Against Illegal Fishing, NORTH COUNTY TIMES.COM, Apr. 5 2006,
http://www.nctimes.com/news/national/article_488c9c35-c69e-5069-b8bl-388761 d65
860.html.
49. United Nations Environment Programme, The State of the Environment in
Somalia: A Desk Study, at p. 33 (2005), available at http://www.unep.org/DEPI/
programmes/SomaliaFinal.pdf.
50. See id.
5 1. See id.
52. Id.
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on the sea floor were indeed uprooted when the tsunami wreaked havoc
on the region.5 3
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN envoy for Somalia, later
confirmed that European and Asian companies were, and currently still
are, dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coast.5 4  Ould-
Abdallah said "What is most alarming here is that nuclear waste is being
dumped. Radioactive uranium waste that is potentially killing Somalis
and completely destroying the ocean."ss Nick Nuttall, a spokesperson
for the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), noted that when the
tsunami smashed open barrels of toxic waste off the Somali coast, it
exposed a "frightening activity."56 Telling of the waste's origin was the
discovery of hospital waste and heavy metals commonly used in large-
scale industry.57 Nuttall echoed the UN's position that a more in-depth
analysis of the situation was required, however "because of the high
levels of insecurity onshore and off the Somali coast, [UNEP] is unable
to carry out an accurate assessment of the extent of the problem."58
Therefore, the culmination of these forces has allowed pirates to
justify their actions and allowed piracy to become socially acceptable as
an industry in Somalia.59 In 2009, 287 incidents of both attempted and
successful pirate attacks were reported to the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB).60 Of those 287 incidents, 196 were committed by pirates
in the Gulf of Aden, relevant parts of the Red Sea, and directly off the
Coast of Somalia.6 1
Those attacks, it would seem, show no signs of slowing. For
example, on October 2, 2009, a Spanish fishing ship with thirty-six
international crewmembers lost contact with the shore after issuing
distress calls saying pirates were attacking the ship off the coast of
Somalia.62 Some sources say that Somali pirates are seizing nearly four
53. See United Nations Environment Programme, National Rapid Environmental
Desk Assessment-Somalia, (2005) at 134, http://www.unep.org.bh/Publications/Somalia/
TSUNAMLSOMALIALAYOUT.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
54. Najad Abdullahi, 'Toxic Waste'Behind Somali Piracy, AL JAZEERA.NET, Oct. 11,
2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See MURPHY, supra note 36, at 101.
60. See ICC Reports, supra note 8, at 7.
61. See id. at 6.
62. See Associated Press, Spanish Ship with 36 Crew Reports Pirate Attack off
Somalia, CNN.COM, Oct. 2, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/02/
somalia.pirates.spanish.ship/index.html.
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ships a week.63 Piracy has become so audacious that several Somali
pirates were captured during an attempted raid on a French warship, the
La Somme.64
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The single most controversial aspect of customary international law
on maritime piracy is the definition of the term "piracy."65 There is no
standard definition for the term.66 The Roman Republic can be credited
with giving piracy its first legal definition. 67  Cicero defined pirates as
hostis humani generi, or enemy of mankind.68 The Romans evolved the
doctrine into an effective statute further defining pirates:
(a) all . . . crimes which constitute 'piracy' [must] occur in areas
outside the municipal jurisdictional competence of any nation; (b) the
'pirate' is . . . [, consequently,] an enemy of [no individual state but]
the [entire] human race; (c) the pirate [must and] should be
prosecuted under municipal law ... after capture, but the right to
prosecute is common to all nations and singular to none.69
This doctrine later came to be known as universal jurisdiction and has
since been reserved for the most egregious violations of international
law.70 However, modern definitions are quite varied. If there is to be a
consensus over how piracy should be internationally prosecuted, the
international community must agree to an objective definition of
prosecutable conduct.
63. See CNN & Per Nyberg, Somali Pirates Hijack Fourth Vessel in a Week,
CNN.COM, Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/01/02/
somalia.hijacking/index.html.
64. See CNN, 5 Held as Confused Pirates Attack French Ship, Oct. 7, 2009,
CNN.COM http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/07/somalia.pirate.attack/
index.html.
65. See Azubuike, supra note 23, at 46.
66. See Havina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 A.J.I.L., 269, 272 (1988).
67. See RUBIN, supra note 26, at 23.
68. See id. at 17 n.61.
69. Burgess, supra note 24, at 302 (quoting Barry Dubner, The Law of International
Sea Piracy (1980)).
70. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in
International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 15, 16 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004.)
("[U]niversal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to
international interests that states are entitled-and even obliged-to bring proceedings
against the perpetrator. . . .").
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A. Definition of the Term "Maritime Piracy"
Several writers have defined "maritime piracy" in different ways.
For example, nineteenth century expert W.E. Hall posits that pirates are
persons who depredate by sea or land without authority from a
sovereign.71 Hall's definition is distinctive in that he removes the place
(or loci) requirement from the term. 72 Specifically, he states
Usually piracy is spoken of as occurring only upon the high seas. If
however a body of pirates land upon an island unappropriated by a
civilized power, and rob and murder a trader who may be carrying on
commerce there with the savage inhabitants, they are guilty of a
crime possessing all the marks of commonplace professional piracy.
In so far as any definitions of piracy exclude such acts, and others
done by pirates elsewhere than on the ocean but of the kind which
would be called piratical if done there, the omission might be
assumed to be accidental.73
Other commentators have held divergent views. Thomas Joseph has
observed that "another mark of a piratical act is that it must be done
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any civilized state."74 Joseph agrees
with Hall's theory that an attack originating at sea but transferred to the
shore of a sovereign without any foreign sovereign authority would be
classified as an act of piracy. However, Joseph argues that the laws of
the attacked nation should be used to prosecute the crime, not the
regimes of international law.
Dr. Lawrence Azubuike reasonably states that "a fair measure of
agreement would seem to have attended the next important ingredient in
the meaning of piracy: piratical acts are done under conditions in which
it is impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for their
commission." 7 6 As previously stated, letters of marque were used for
this precise purpose;7 7 they were used to determine whether a pirate's
actions were sponsored by a sovereign nation, an organized political
body, a society, or nothing at all. A pirate may also by "the nature of his
act ... [show] an intention or power to reject the authority of that state to
which he is properly subject."78 It would seem that if there were one
71. See W.E. HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-15 (Henry Frowde, ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1895) (1880).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. THOMAS J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 (1905).
75. See id.
76. Azubuike, supra note 23, at 47.
77. See id.
78. HALL, supra note 71, at 215.
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particularly common element in the definition of piracy, it would be
whether the acts of persons appearing to be pirates can be attributable to
any sovereign nation.7 9 Therefore, as Dr. Azubuike states, "if one feature
should be predominant, or control, in the definition of piracy, it is
whether the action of any pirate, or alleged pirate, can legally or fairly be
attributable to a state."80 If an "act of piracy" can be attributable to a
state, then what exactly does that make the act in the eyes of the
international community? It may no longer be piracy.
Other elements of "maritime piracy" include the specific acts pirates
must commit for international law to consider the act piracy.8' Early
scholars such as Sir William Blackstone interpreted piracy as
"committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas,
which, if committed upon land, would have amounted to a felony
there."8 A more contemporary effort to codify the actus reus element of
piracy was formed by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 8 3 a member of the United
Nations International Law Commission from 1953 to 1954 and a Judge
of the International Court of Justice from 1955 to 1960.84 Oppenheim's
International Law, edited by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, stated:
[i]f a definition is desired which really covers all such acts as are in
practice treated as piratical, piracy must be defined as every
unauthorized act of violence against persons or goods committed on
the open sea either by a private vessel against another vessel or by the
mutinous crew or passengers against their own vessel.85
The Harvard Research Project also weighed in on the issue. They
claimed:
An investigation finds that instead of a single relatively simple
problem, there are a series of difficult problems which have
occasioned a great diversity of professional opinion. In studying the
content of the (definition) article, it is useful to bear in mind the
chaos of expert opinion as to what the law of nations includes, or
should include, in piracy. There is no authoritative definition. Of the
many definitions that have been proposed, most are inaccurate, both
79. See id.
80. Azubuike, supra note 23, at 47.
81. See id.
82. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72.
83. See Malvina Halberstam, Article, Terrorism in the High Seas: The Achille
Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 273
(1988).
84. See generally Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 1897-1960, http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/
aboutthecentre/sirhersch_1auterpacht.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
85. Halberstam, supra note 83, at 273.
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as to what they literally include and as to what the omit. Some are
impromptu, rough descriptions of a typical piracy.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS),"
has been understood to require that for an act to be considered piracy per
se, it must be for private gain. 8 UNCLOS is one of the prevailing treaty
regimes on piracy.89
B. Analysis of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
of 1982
UNCLOS is one of the two widely accepted legal regimes of the
international law on piracy.90 UNCLOS represented a major effort in a
long string of attempts by the international community to properly codify
a comprehensive convention on the laws against piracy. As early as
1924, the League of Nations attempted to craft an international accord on
91 92the matter.91 They unfortunately failed in their initial endeavors.
Delegates not only felt that the matter of international piracy was not
important enough to be directly addressed; they also felt that it would be
impossible to reach an international consensus as to what the law should
contain.93  Professor Alfred Rubin cites the words of Polish
Representative, Minister August Zaleski, on the matter which were
approved as part of dismissing the matter on June 13, 1927:
It is perhaps doubtful whether the question of piracy is of sufficient
real interest in the present state of the world to justify its inclusion in
the programme of the (proposed) conference, if the scope of the
conference ought to be cut down. The subject is in any case not one
of vital interest for every State, or one the treatment of which can be
regarded as in any way urgent, and the replies of certain
86. RUBIN, supra note 26, at 341.
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
88. See Martin Murphy, Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help
Regional States Combat Piracy?, in PETER LEHR, (ed.), VIOLENCE AT SEA (2006) 160; See
also Ethan C. Stiles, Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea
Piracy, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 299, 322-25 (2009).
89. See John Peppetti, Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A
Multinational Legal Structure to Combat Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73,
92 (2008).
90. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 87. See also John Peppetti, supra note 89, at
92.
91. See RUBIN, supra note 26, at 333-34.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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Governments with regard to it indicate that there are difficulties in
the way of concluding a universal agreement. 94
If the age-old saying "hindsight is always 20/20" needed a real life
demonstration, this would be it.
While it is unfortunate that the League of Nations was unable, if
merely uninterested, to bring hard and fast rules to prosecute acts of
international piracy, the United Nations was more successful when it
passed the Convention on the High Seas in 1958.95 This Convention
served as the basis for the subsequently adopted UNCLOS.96  Unlike
most treaties, UNCLOS is binding not only on those parties that are
signatories, but also on parties that are not.97 The definition of piracy
contained in UNCLOS has become customary international law, and
therefore it is binding on all nations including non-signatories. 98
UNCLOS also creates various zones, depending on the distance from the
coast of a sovereign, which determines the jurisdictional rights of the
coastal nation.99 Broadly, these are zones are territorial waters, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the high seas.100
The territorial waters of a state are defined as the first twelve miles
out to the sea from a state's shoreline. 01 The state exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over these first twelve miles subject to the right of innocent
passage vested in the ships or vessels of other states. 10 2 The contiguous
zone is twenty-four miles from the coastline and twelve miles beyond the
territorial waters. 10 3  It is in this area that "[T]he coastal State may
exercise the control necessary to ... prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea."l 04 Additionally, UNCLOS provides that a state can claim
94. Id.
95. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312; Peppetti, supra
note 89, at 91.
96. See id.
97. See Bahar, supra note 22, at 10. ("The United States is not a party to UNCLOS,
but it is a party to the 1958 High Seas Convention. Regardless, the definition of piracy
contained within both these treaties has become customary international law, binding on
all nations, including the United States.")
98. See id.
99. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, arts. 2, 33, 55 & 87. For the purposes of this
Comment, the territorial seas include the internal waters of the state, the zone which the
UNCLOS defines as the territorial seas, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic
zone.
100. See id.
101. See id. at art. 3.
102. See id. at art. 19.
103. See id. at art. 33.
104. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, at art. 33.
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up to 200 miles from its coastlines as its exclusive economic zone. 1o It
is important to note here that this entitles the coastal state to "sovereign
rights [that allow it] to exclusively exploit the marine resources" within
that zone.106
Any other areas are considered the high seas. 07  The high seas
belong to all, and to no one, under the doctrine of the freedom of the high
seas. os For the present purpose, the significance of this classification is
that for an activity to qualify as international piracy under UNCLOS, it
must occur on the high seas. 1 09 The provisions of UNCLOS dealing with
piracy span Articles 100 to 107110 and mandate that all states should act
to the full extent of their capabilities to contain and prosecute piracy on
the high seas."' Article 101 specifically seeks to address and define
piracy.
UNCLOS Article 101 defines maritime piracy as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in subparagraph (a) or (b).112
For statistical purposes, the International Maritime Board (IMB) enlarges
the scope of the UNCLOS definition to include both actual and
105. See id. at art. 57. See also Tammy Sittnick, Comment, State Responsibility and
Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to
Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 743, 758 (2005).
106. See Sittnick, supra note 105, at 758.
107. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, at art. 86.
108. See id. at art. 87 (detailing the rights encapsulated in the doctrine of freedom of
the high seas); see generally Natalie Klein, Article, The Right of Visit and the 2005
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 287, 292-95 (2007).
109. See Azubiuke, supra note 23, at 47.
110. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, at arts. 100-07.
111. See id. at art. 100.
112. Id. at art. 101.
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attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea.' 13 The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations'
specialized agency responsible for improving maritime safety by
providing a regulatory framework for its member states. 1 14 IMO recently
addressed the jurisdictional issue raised by IMB in the Draft Code of
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships.' 15 IMO lobbied for the creation of a separate crime called
"armed robbery against ships" and defined it as "any unlawful act of
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other
than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or
property on board such a ship, within a State's jurisdiction over such
offences."ll 6  The Code of Practice includes both the UNCLOS
definition of piracy and the armed-robbery-against-ships addendum. 17
C. Regulatory Gaps in UNCLOS
The statutory language of UNCLOS is not without large gaps that
make applying its provisions very difficult under the circumstances of a
failed government, such as in Somalia." 8 For example, the language of
UNCLOS also implies that the terms "pirate" and "terrorist" are
divergent in meaning because the political motives of terrorists are not
addressed by the convention.119 Exacerbating this regulatory lacuna is
the fact that the only entities allowed to seize pirate vessels under
UNCLOS are sovereign states.120  As a problematic consequence,
Somalia is unable to enforce these policies for itself. Further, states can
only seize vessels within their own territorial waters or on the high
113. International Maritime Organization [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1, U.N. Doc. Ref. T2-MSS/2.11.4.1 MSC.4/Circ.145
(Nov. 10, 2009).
114. International Maritime Organization, About IMO, http://www.imo.org (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009).
115. International Maritime Organization, Res. A 922 (22), 2.1, U.N. Doc. A
22/Res.922 (Nov. 29, 2001).
116. Id. 12.2.
117. See id.
118. See Brooke A. Bornick, Case Comment, Bounty Hunters and Pirates: Filling in
the Gaps of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 259, 266
(2005).
119. See Tina Garmon, Comment, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law
of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L. J. 257, 275
(2002); Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co., (1909) 1 K.B.
785 (Bolivian rebels were not considered pirates because they acted with a "political,"
rather than "private" motive when they attacked a Bolivian cargo vessel). See also
Lawrence J. Kahn, Article, Pirates, Rovers, and Thieves: New Problems with an Old
Enemy, 20 TUL. MAR. L. J. 293, 310 (1996).
120. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, at arts. 100-07.
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seas,121 which means that a coastal nation cannot pursue pirates through a
third-party nation's territorial waters. 12 2
The "private ends" element of piracy, as defined by UNCLOS,
precludes politically motivated attacks from being considered acts of
piracy.12 3 Most pirate attacks occur within the territorial waters of a
sovereign nation.' 2 4 When the piratical acts are politically motivated, the
coastal sovereign holds exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of whether
exercising its jurisdiction is reasonable.12 5 Similarly, the "private ship"
element also precludes government-sponsored attacks to be considered
acts of piracy.12 6 Government ships have, from time to time, been used
to commit acts of piracy and theft,12 7 but UNCLOS excludes government
ships from being classified as pirate vessels unless they are under
mutiny.12 8 One example occurred in 1995 when M/V Anna Sierra was
hijacked off the coast of Thailand.12 9 After successfully hijacking the
ship, pirates placed the crew in crudely constructed boats and set them
adrift.13 0 The pirates then repainted and renamed the ship and sailed it to
China, where they were not prosecuted.131 Not only did China fail to
prosecute the pirates; Chinese authorities did not even return the boat to
the rightful owners.132
The "high seas" element of piracy precludes maritime violence in
territorial waters from being considered acts of piracy.' 33 Establishing
proper jurisdiction among territorial waters is not always straightforward
because some coastal nations have shared waters. 134 One scholar has
noted two critical questions arise from this situation. First, are exclusive
economic zones part of the costal nation's territorial waters or high seas?
Second, can a state try pirates captured in the territorial waters of another
nation? 3 5 As will be explained, in the case of Somali pirates, the UN has
passed several resolutions in order to shore up the holes in applicable
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Bornick, supra note 118, at 262.
124. Barry Hart Dubner, Article, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster-Two
Problems that Defy the "Norms" of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 1, 34 (1997).
125. See Garmon, supra note 119, at 265.
126. See Bomick, supra note 118, at 262.
127. The Economist, Those in Peril on the Sea, Aug. 9, 1997, at 40.
128. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, at art. 102.
129. See Dubner, supra note 124, at 6-7.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Bomick, supra note 118, at 263.
134. See Dubner, supra note 124, at 1.
135. See Zou Keyuan, Article, Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea,
31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 107, 115 (2000).
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international maritime law. Before these resolutions can be discussed, it
is important to analyze the second largest body of maritime law used by
the UN.
D. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988: A Moderate Response to
the Shortcomings of the UNCLOS
The second of the two widely accepted legal regimes is The 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, more commonly known as the Rome
Convention.136 The Rome Convention was opened for signing in 1988
but it was not actually codified until 1992.137 The Rome Convention was
particularly different from UNCLOS in that it was specifically dedicated
to the broader subject of controlling violence.138
Scholars maintain that the primary catalyst for the Rome
Convention was "the hijacking, hostage taking, and murder committed
on board the Italian-flagged passenger liner Achille Lauro [sic] in
1985."l139 The Rome Convention thus was made applicable to all acts of
violence.140  It took the tragedy of the Achille Lauro to bring the
inadequacies of UNCLOS to the attention of international lawmakers.141
Legal authorities quickly realized that UNCLOS was inapplicable to the
Achille Lauro incident because UNCLOS does not govern a situation in
136. See generally United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 1, 1992, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
Rome Convention]; see also Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 43 INT'L
LAW. 915, 922 (2009).
137. See International Maritime Organization, Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, available at
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topicid=259&doc-id=686 (lists entry
into force as March 1, 1992).
138. See Stiles, supra note 88, at 310.
139. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Article, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The
Coalition is the Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 243, 282 (2009). The Achille Laura's
story is one of horror and tragedy:
[M]embers of the Palestine Liberation Front overran the Achille Lauro and held
its twelve American passengers at gunpoint ... the PLF gunmen did not merely
incarcerate the Americans but decided to make an example of one of them.
Their choice was a handicapped sixty-nine-year old New Yorker named Leon
Klinghoffer, an American Jew. The terrorists pushed Klinghoffer's wheelchair
to the edge of the deck, shot him in the back, and pitched his still twitching
body into the sea.
MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 1776 TO
THE PRESENT 556 (2007).
140. See Rome Convention, supra note 136, at art. 3.
141. See Helmut Tuerk, Article, Combating Terrorism at Sea-The Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 337, 338-39 (2008).
202 [Vol. 29:1
COME ALL YE FAITHFUL
which criminals, or in this case terrorists, do not utilize an opposing
vessel. 142 The plain-language definition of piracy included in UNCLOS
only concerns acts committed "by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft." 43 This portion of UNCLOS is problematic in
tackling hijackings that exclude the use of another ship because the
provision requires that the illegal act be for "private ends."'" In the case
of the Achille Lauro, terrorists were not acting towards private ends, but
rather towards political ones.145
The Rome Convention attempted to quell these concerns by
removing the "private ends" requirement and expanding the definition of
piracy to acts regardless of the involvement of any other vessels.14 6 The
main offenses outlined by the Rome Convention include: (1) the
unlawful and intentional seizure of a ship; and (2) gaining control of a
ship by force, threat, or other type of intimidation.147  Also, the
Convention required signatories to legislate domestic law that takes into
account the "grave nature" of the offense,148 and to prosecute or extradite
the accused.149
An argument against harnessing the Rome Convention to combat
widespread acts of piracy is that when drafted, the Convention was
meant to address acts of terrorism, not piracy.150 Opponents are correct
in their assertion that the Rome Convention was written to combat
terrorism. However, the provisions contained therein are directly
applicable to the violence that accompanies most modern acts of
maritime piracy.' 5 Importantly, the Convention also applies to the act of
hostage taking, which has been a hallmark of Somali piracy to date. 52
The Rome Convention's definition of piracy includes: (1) any acts or
attempted acts of violence committed against a person or ship, seizing
control, damaging, or destroying a ship;15 3 and (2) those acts that attach
criminal liability for aiding and abetting the aforementioned actions. 5 4
142. See Niclas Dahlvang, Article, Thieves Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st
Century, 4 REGENT J. INT'L. L. 17, 27 (2006).
143. UNCLOS, supra note 87, at art. 101(a).
144. See id.
145. See Dahivang, supra note 142, at 27.
146. Rome Convention, supra note 136, at art. 3.
147. See id. at art. 3(1)(1).
148. Id. at art. 5.
149. Id. at art. 7(1).
150. See Matthew C. Houghton, Walking the Plank: How United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1816, While Progressive, Fails to Provide a Comprehensive Solution
to Somali Piracy, 16 TULSA J. OF COMP. AND INT'L L., 253, 274 (2009).
151. See Murphy, supra note 88, at 155.
152. See Houghton, supra note 150, at 256.
153. See Rome Convention, supra note 136, at art. 3.
154. See id.
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Several other subtle differences exist between the Rome Convention
and UNCLOS. While UNCLOS allows universal jurisdiction for any
state to seize a ship believed to be engaging in acts of piracy on the high
seas,'55 the Rome Convention has not been declared a codification of
customary international law and thus only applies to member states with
specific connections to the vessel they are seizing.15 6 UNCLOS further
allows any member state to board a vessel suspected of piracy, so long as
that vessel is in either international waters or the territorial waters of the
Member State.157 UNCLOS restricts its discussion of piracy to the high
seas, whereas the Rome Convention increases the jurisdictional area to
also cover the territorial waters of other states as well. 58  Lastly, the
Rome Convention covers ships which travel outside of, and acts that
occur within, their own territorial waters.159 Despite the subtle
differences in application of the two Conventions, both unfortunately
place large jurisdictional barriers between pirates and the forces seeking
to suppress them.16 0
E. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Combating
Somali Piracy
Recently the UN has attempted to remedy the regulatory holes in
UNCLOS and the Rome Convention by issuing several resolutions under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.161 In June 2008, the Security Council,
with permission of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia,162 allowed states cooperating with Somalia's transitional
government to "[e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose
of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea." 6 3 Resolution
1816 also allowed states the right to use "all necessary means" to combat
the swelling number of pirate attacks in the region, but it also
necessitated advance notice by the assisting nations of such activity to
the Security Council.16 4  One commentary on the action stated: "In
practical terms, the resolution made it lawful for foreign navies to chase
pirates into Somali waters and, if necessary, to use force against
them." 65
155. See Bahar, supra note 22, at 10.
156. See Stiles, supra note 88, at 312.
157. See UNCLOS, supra note 88, at art. 111.
158. See Stiles, supra note 88, at 309-312.
159. See The Rome Convention, supra note 136, art. 4.
160. See generally Stiles, supra note 88, at 308-312.
161. See Becker, supra note 136, at 923.
162. See S.C. Res. 1816, $7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Becker, supra note 136, at 921.
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As the chaos in the region continued to mount, the Security Council
dropped the notice requirement when it issued Resolution 1838 in
October 2008.166 The Security Council urgently called upon interested
states "to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off
the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and
military aircraft" to the nation.1 67  In December 2008, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1846.168 The resolution reaffirmed the valiant
efforts of those states that had already sent forces to the region and, more
importantly, authorized states and regional organizations to seize and
dispose of "boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment" used for
piratical purposes and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. 16 9
Resolution 1846 authorized seizures where there is "reasonable ground
for suspecting such use."170
It would seem, however, that when placed alongside UNCLOS,
Resolution 1846 has created more legal questions than answers. First,
UNCLOS provides that:
The courts of the State which [carries] out the seizure [of a ship
engaged in piracy] may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and
may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships,
aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in
good faith.
However, the proper procedures for investigating and prosecuting acts of
maritime piracy are not clearly defined.172 Second, the issue of how to
deal with "suspected" pirates in the region, as opposed to those
apprehended while in the commission of piracy, remains an unclear and
contested point.'73 The IMO has since requested that the UN Security
Council create "clear rules of engagement" for the multinational forces
operating in the region.1 74 Resolution 1846 authorizes states to suppress
piracy on the basis of "reasonable suspicion"'7 5 which does not provide
an answer to IMO's request. In essence, the resolution serves as an open
166. See S.C. Res. 1838, IT 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
167. Id.
168. See S.C. Res. 1846, 6 & 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. UNCLOS, supra note 88, at art. 105.
172. See Becker, supra note 136, at 922.
173. Alan Cowell, Danish Navy Rescues Suspected Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/world/europe/06pirate.html (Danish
authorities refused to arrest a group of men rescued from a disabled speedboat with
weapons onboard).
174. Abdi Sheikh, Major Shippers Skirt Gulf of Aden to Avoid Pirates, REUTERS,
Nov. 20, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE4AI5S220081121.
175. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 168, 1f 6 & 9.
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invitation from the UN Security Council for all able nations to enter the
territorial waters of Somalia. But the invitation has minimal procedural
guidelines.
Lastly, Resolution 1851 opened Somalia's borders to international
forces for use in land-based operations.176 The resolution also finally
made special notice of the challenges involved with prosecuting pirates
because Somalia currently has no functional justice system."' All other
regional states have functioning courts of law, trained prosecutors,
experienced judges, and adequate legislation. 178 Most of these countries
are also parties to some or all relevant international legal instruments,
which could be leveraged among the parties in order to broaden
cooperation.17 9 Further, Resolution 1851 encourages states engaged in
the fight against Somali piracy to take onboard their vessels law
enforcement officials, or "ship riders," from neighbouring states that will
be taking in the majority of captured pirates for prosecution.' 8 0
These resolutions, while progressive, fail to fully address the
multitude of causes that transform a common indigent into a machine-
gun wielding, hostage-taking pirate. The UN Secretary-General
mentioned during the adoption proceedings of Resolution 1851 that:
[e]veryone must be mindful that piracy was a symptom of the state of
anarchy that had persisted in Somalia for more than 17 years. Anti-
piracy efforts, therefore, must be placed in the context of a
comprehensive approach that fostered an inclusive peace process in
Somalia and assisted the parties to rebuild security, governance
capacity, addressed human rights issues and harnessed economic
opportunities throughout the country.' 8 '
Part of that comprehensive approach is being mindful that some of the
root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa are illegal dumping, illegal
fishing, and a multitude of other human-rights violations.' 82 While most
of the UN Resolutions on the matter open the door for international naval
and militaristic options, Resolution 1851 was the first that actually
reminded the community that big guns alone won't be enough to solve
176. See S.C. Res. 1851, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
177. See James Kraska & Brian Wilson, supra note 139, at 280.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 176, 3.
181. United Nations Department of Public Information, Council Authorizes States to
Use Land-Based Operations in Somalia, As Part of Fight Against Piracy Off Coast,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1851, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2008/sc954 1.doc.htm.
182. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at P 5.4.2.
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this problem.183  While ultimately a product of the United Nations
Security Council, Resolution 1851's recommendations are closely related
to those presented in the November 2008 Nairobi Report.184
F. The Nairobi Report
The Nairobi Report was a product of UN experts who gathered in
Kenya to consider new legal and political approaches to combating
piracy. 185 Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary
General, Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, commissioned the
meeting which consisted of experts in virtually all areas of regional
government, economics, humanitarian and military efforts.186  The
product of this meeting was the most thorough UN study to date of legal
and policy issues associated with Somali piracy.187 The panel's goal was
to determine what measures had already been taken to combat piracy on
the local, state and international level, and to determine additional
measures that should be taken.188 As one scholar notes, "[t]he Nairobi
Report is recognized as an authoritative and unparalleled source of
context, background, and analysis on the problem of maritime piracy in
the Horn of Africa."189
The Nairobi Report recognizes that pirates generally believe that
their actions are justified in response to illegal fishing or illegal dumping
in Somali waters. 190 However, the Report classifies illegal fishing and
dumping in Somalia as secondary issues that would be subsequently
curbed by the adoption of other recommendations aimed at thwarting
piracy. 191 UNCLOS vests sovereign rights in state governments for the
purpose of harvesting or conserving resources in their own territorial
waters. 19 2 It is the duty of the governments of coastal states to enforce
their fishing laws by such methods as searching vessels, making arrests,
183. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 176, 4 ("Encourages all States ... fighting
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international
cooperation mechanism ... on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea
off Somalia's coast.").
184. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 139, at 274.
185. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at 2.
186. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 139, at 277.
187. See id. at 277.
188. See id. at 274.
189. Id.
190. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, P 4.
191. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, P 3.1.2 ("Poverty, lack of employment,
environmental hardship . . . due to drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and
political situation all contribute to the rise and continuance of piracy in Somalia. This
situation will remain so until there is . . . action taken against [piracy].")
192. See UNCLOS, supra note 88, at art. 56(1)(a).
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mandating licenses, or seizing ships if established laws are not complied
with.193 Again, the obvious question becomes: who can enforce the law?
Likewise, coastal governments have rights regarding illegal
dumping. The law of the sea defines "dumping" as "pollution of the
marine environment by the deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter
from vessels."' 94 Again, the law of the sea places the responsibility on
coastal states to adopt laws to manage and control illegal dumping.195
The law is structured in this manner because then the coastal state is
responsible for any failure to comply with the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
and The London Convention, its 1996 Protocol.196 Clearly, these laws
were not designed to properly function in the case of a failed state such
as Somalia.
The most pressing recommendations proposed by the Nairobi
Report were those that spoke to resolving the greater problem of
economic and social instability in the region.' 97 These recommendations,
at least in part, aimed to prevent the expert group's greatest fear from
becoming realized: the transformation of the semiautonomous region of
Puntland into a pirate state.' 98 The report explains that the situation
cannot be contained within Somali borders and has become a threat to
international stability, peace and security.' 99
The report's recommendations are not groundbreaking or
revolutionary, and there is no single "silver bullet" solution.
Development of the economy, establishing a rule of law in Somalia, and
including Somalia in the political, economic, and security framework of
the region are all elementary responses but yet are the forefront
recommendations for the long-term success against pirates.200 Some
simple tactics that have been proposed include: (1) developing the
fishing industry in Somalia; 201 (2) building up local infrastructure in
193. See id. at art. 73.
194. Id. at art. 1(1)(5)(a)(i).
195. See id. at art. 210.
196. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 6 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, as amended by 1996
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1.
197. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at P 8.2, P 8.3. (The report makes
recommendations based on the timeline necessary for their implementation. The noted
sections are recommendations that take place over a "medium-term" and "long-term"
timeline.).
198. See id. at P 8.2.1.
199. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 139, at 274.
200. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at P 8.2.1, P 8.2.2, P 8.2.3.
201. See id., at P8.2.2.
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Somalia coastal communities through labor-intensive job creation;202
(3) providing vocational training for the unemployed youth;2 03
(4) supporting pastoralists in the Puntland regions;204 and (5) actually
205
considering Somalia within the priorities of the community of nations,
as simple yet effective ways of bringing stability to the region.
While the report also calls for the immediate curbing of piracy
through "impact" measures, these measures are only effective in the
short-term.206 For example, it is imperative to establish a shore-based
monitoring system using local communities to look out for boats
suspected to be involved in illegal dumping and fishing.20 7 However, it
is also imperative for the international community to understand that
piracy will not be suppressed unless the people in coastal population
centers are provided with alternative revenue. 20 8 In turn, Somalia must
have at least a minimal system of law on which to rely in order for
business, trade, and commerce to develop.2 09
IV. CONCLUSION
"Piracy off the Somali coast is only one manifestation of the tragic
events [the] country has experienced for almost 20 years." 2 10 No longer
are the effects of crippling poverty and desperation confined within
Somali borders; they are spilling over it. The Somali Transitional
Federal Government has been recognized as the official government of
Somalia since UN Resolution 1816 in June 2008.211 Thus, if the
international community is willing to support the TFG fight pirates off
the coast of Somalia, it should also help to stamp out the root causes of
piracy by combating Somali poverty. Indeed, developed nations have
encouraged the use of big guns and big ships, and made big headlines,212
but the true focus of the international effort should be to provide stability
on land through a rule of law, rather than to simply monitor every vessel
that passes through the Gulf of Aden.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at P 8.3.
206. Id. at P 8.1.
207. See id. at P 8.1.2.
208. See id. at P 8.2.
209. See id.
210. Nairobi Report, supra note 2, at 2.
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Frankly, the numbers are staggering. Nearly 20,000 ships pass
through the Gulf of Aden annually. 213 It is as unreasonable as it is
unrealistic to believe that the international naval task force stationed in
the Gulf of Aden could hope to safeguard every single vessel. It is also
unreasonable to believe that international support will remain
indefinitely. For example, the Security Council has authorized an
international military presence in the region only until November 28,
2010.214 Somalia has been without any rule of law for the past twenty
years, and it is unlikely that it will change anytime soon without funding
and support from the international community of states.
The course of action is clear. First, international maritime laws
must be amended in order to be able to cope with irregular attacks and
depredation at sea. The shortcomings and gaps within UNCLOS and the
Rome Convention are too large to ignore. Second, no amount of UN
Security Council Resolutions will defeat the scourge of piracy without a
focused effort. The financial incentive for committing acts of piracy
must be deterred, which in turn means that alternative sources of income
must be established. Lastly, for any of these outcomes to be realized
there must be a rule of law instituted in Somalia. Currently, Kenya has
agreed to take in most suspected pirates for trial,215 but it is unclear how
long this arrangement will last.
In many cases, international maritime law has failed to curb Somali
piracy. There is still time to right these wrongs, but time is of the
essence. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that "we must act
before it is too late." 2 16 For the ten Ukrainians, eight Bulgarians, five
Indians and two Romanians taken hostage aboard the Asian Glory on
January 2, 2010,217 it may already be too late.2 18
213. See John W. Miller, Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping Costs, WALL ST. J., Nov.
19, 2008, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1227018647
43437147.html; Factbox-The Dangerous Gulf of Aden, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL3623 177.
214. See S.C. Res. 1897, T 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 28, 2009)(authorizing
military action in cooperation with the TFG for twelve months from the date of the
resolution).
215. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 176, 2 (thanking Kenya for its support in
prosecuting suspected pirates).
216. U.N. Dep't of Public Information, supra note 181.
217. See Tristan McConnell, Somali Pirates Hijack Second British-Flagged Ship,
TIMESONLINE.CO.UK, Jan. 3, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africal
article6974534.ece.
218. Jean Paul Arouff, Mauritius Says Ready to Try, Imprison Pirates, REUTERS, June
12, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65BO21 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010)
(Prior to final publishing of this Comment, the Asian Glory and her Eastern European
crew were released after an unspecified ransom was paid.).
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